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Source: State Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People's Republic of China 2008, China Statistic Yearbook 2008
Th e biggest bilateral current account and trade surplus of China is vis-à-vis the United States, while the European current account defi cit against China is increasing. However, China achieves current account defi cits vis-à-vis Japan and other Asian countries which depreciated their currencies heavily during the Asian crisis in 1997. 3 Because of this trade constellation China has become a growth engine for the Asian region.
Until recently, China had implemented a comprehensive system of capital controls which has only been relaxed a bit in the past few years. Th e logic of the capital control system is simple: all types of capital fl ows are strictly controlled with the exception of foreign direct investment (FDI) infl ows. In the 1980s capital fl ows in China were negligible. In the early 1990s FDI infl ows to China jumped to high and stable levels and increased even after 2001. Compared with other developing countries net portfolio fl ows and other net capital fl ows (international bank credits) remained relatively small (cf. Figure 2 on the next page). In June 2008 foreign debt in China was only 427 billion $, slightly above ten per cent of GDP. 4 In China, fi rms, public households and banks were restricted in the infl ow of hard Forum currency which could be used to fi nance a current account defi cit or used for capital export (or rather, capital fl ight) by other units like private households. 5 All in all, capital controls have worked. To a large extent, China was able to structure capital fl ows in its own interest, follow a domestic orientated monetary policy and never suff ered from a currency crisis -a privilege not shared by many developing and even developed countries in the world (Prasad/Wei 2005 , Herr 2008 . China is an immature net creditor country. Chinese foreign monetary wealth is denominated in US dollars and other key currencies. Th is means that appreciations of RMB lead to negative wealth eff ects and can destroy the equity of Chinese holders of foreign wealth. It can also lead to quick and substantial portfolio shifts from foreign currency to domestic currency inside the country. Th e lion's share of foreign Chinese assets is kept by the PBoC which would not really suff er if the domestic value of foreign reserves were even signifi cantly reduced. Singapore, another immature net creditor country, solved the problem by creating two sovereign wealth funds which kept most of its foreign wealth. China followed this strategy when it created the China Investment Corporation in 2007 which received 200 billion $ from the foreign reserves held by the PBoC (McKinnon/ Schnabl 2008) . What is important here is that the RMB can appreciate without large negative wealth eff ects for the Chinese private sector. 150,00 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 
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Russia is a good example of a country with high capital infl ows to fi nance high capital outfl ows. After the start of the Russian transition in the early 1990s and due to oil and gas exports Russia never had defi cits in the current account. In spite of this the country accumulated a huge gross debt in foreign currency. When the rouble exchange rate collapsed in 1998 the Russian fi nancial system was wiped out. Th is can happen again. In spite of the huge Russian current account surpluses in recent years Russian foreign debt was around 28 per cent of GDP at the end of 2007 (World Fact Book 2008) .
China has experimented with several exchange rate regimes. In 1981 a dual exchange rate regime was established, which fi xed diff erent exchange rates for diff erent types of transactions. In 1985 the exchange rate for international trade was allowed to fl oat. Beginning in the late 1980s this exchange rate started to depreciate sharply and lost nearly 50 per cent of its value vis-à-vis the US dollar. In 1994 China pegged the then unifi ed exchange rate unoffi cially to the US dollar at a level which made Chinese products internationally competitive. In line with increasing Chinese current account surpluses, pressure to appreciate the RMB intensifi ed, especially from the United States. ›China bashing‹ worked, and in 2005 China pegged the RMB to an (unknown) basket of currencies, allowing for a continuous and moderate appreciation of the RMB vis-à-vis the US dollar. It is noteworthy that, over a long period, and also after switching to a crawling peg, the RMB depreciated substantially vis-à-vis the euro (cf. Figure 3) . Th e real eff ective exchange rate of RMB was about the same in 2007 as at the end of the 1990s. It would be wrong to speak of a substantial appreciation of the RMB after 2005. Starting in 2002 China attracted very high capital infl ows coming from high FDI infl ows, fi nancial infl ows connected with FDI like credits between foreign parent companies and subsidiaries in China, and also illegal capital infl ows. Th e latter are refl ected in errors and omissions. Before and after the Asian crisis in 1997 errors and omissions indicated illegal capital outfl ows. Wealth owners in this period obviously expected that China would join other Asian countries and devalue the RMB substantially. In 2002 and thereafter, errors and omissions showed high illegal capital infl ows for some years (cf. Figure 2) . Th e explosion of the Chinese current account surpluses in recent years probably also refl ects illegal capital infl ows, as exporters have artifi cially increased export prices and reduced import prices to transfer funds to China. According to Zhang and Xu's (2008) calculation the stock of speculative money in China (hot money from trade surplus, non remitted profi ts, FDI infl ows etc.) increased from 140 billion $ in 2004 to 541 billion $ in 2007. 6 Speculative capital infl ows are triggered by expectations of a further and faster appreciation of the RMB. Current account surpluses and non-speculative capital infl ows in China have simply become too big to believe that the crawling peg regime established in 2005 is sustainable.
7 Th e conundrum is that Chinese current account surpluses did not become smaller in spite of a (moderate) real appreciation after 2005. Obviously, for political reasons an exchange rate target for the RMB was chosen which created huge current account surpluses and the PBoC was forced to intervene in the foreign exchange market without quantitative limits to reach the exchange rate target. It is frequently argued that savings in China are too high and that this is the explanation for the Chinese current account surpluses. Savings in China are high, albeit not really the explanation for the interventions of the PBoC. If there is a relationship between current account surpluses and domestic savings, then it is the other way round. Current account surpluses created by the PBoC stimulate domestic income creation, and in this way savings.
One noteworthy point is that China has been able to successfully sterilise huge central bank interventions. Firstly, the PBoC issued its own debt-securities in domestic currency which were bought by the domestic fi nancial system. Secondly, minimum reserve requirements were increased continuously. Although sterilisation can become costly for a central bank, the demand stimulation which is created by central bank interventions can more than compensate the costs of sterilisation.
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Chinese surpluses and the world economy
Th ere is no doubt that China's current account surpluses are harmful for economic growth in other countries. However, during the last decade countries like Germany and Japan have achieved surpluses of comparable magnitude. And a relevant number of developing countries followed the Chinese strategy of stimulating exports by central bank interventions (cf. Figure 4) . After 2005 Chinese surpluses increased sharply and became the biggest in the 6 Th e Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange believes that the stock of speculative money is substantially lower. 7
McKinnon and Schnabl (2008) believe that the crawling peg stimulates capital infl ows to China and a step to fi x the RMB exchange rate again at the present exchange rate and at the same time to give up ›China bashing‹ would stop speculative capital infl ows. Th is argument is not convincing. Chinese surpluses are too big to be sustainable. 8
For long periods sterilisation costs did not exist in China as the PBoC yielded higher interest rates for reserve holdings in foreign countries than it had to off er for its own debt-securities issued.
world.
9 Nevertheless, it would be unfair to blame China as the key problem in the world economy when developed countries like Germany and many other developing countries also follow an export-oriented strategy. 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund 2008
Not all countries in the world can follow a mercantile strategy, as the sum of all current account imbalances in the world is zero. Th e main problem of a group of countries with high current account surpluses is that they use export promotion to stimulate their domestic economies and export low growth and unemployment. 10 Only if countries with current account defi cits were to produce under full capacity utilisation and/or full employment, or if defi cit countries are able to compensate the lack of demand created by current account deficits by stimulating domestic demand, would current account surplus countries do no harm to the output and employment in defi cit countries. But these are very special and rare cases. From a global perspective a group of countries which actively strives for current account surpluses most likely reduces GDP growth in current account defi cit countries, for example, if they are hit by a currency crisis. Th e reduction of growth in defi cit countries reduces their imports and negatively aff ects growth in surplus countries. If all or even most coun- tries in the world strive for current account surpluses, a worldwide coordination problem is created which most likely will reduce world growth.
11 However, there is a ›solution‹ for this worldwide coordination problem: a consumer of last resort. A consumer of last resort passively accepts current account defi cits, manages to keep domestic growth relatively high by domestic demand stimulation, and in this way increases world GDP growth. Since the 1980s and especially since the 1990s the United States has taken over this function and has experienced huge current account defi cits. Th e USA was pushed into this constellation by large capital imports which, for a substantial part, came from interventions in the foreign exchange market by central banks around the world (Summers 2004) .
Th e function as a consumer of last resort can only be assumed by a country which is big, produces one of the world's key currencies and is the heart of the global fi nancial market. No country in the world other than the USA could have accepted and at the same time produced such huge current account defi cits. As a mature international debtor country the USA is able to become indebted in its own domestic currency. Th is is a signifi cant privilege, because in spite of its own huge foreign debt, the USA cannot become over indebted in foreign currency, and for this reason does not suff er from the ›fear of depreciation‹. For a long time the USA was able to combine large current account defi cits and high GDP growth -one of the conditions for taking over the function of the consumer of last resort. Growth in the USA was supported by an expansionary fi scal policy and by a policy of very low interest rates (Stiglitz 2006: 250) . It would go too far to make China and other surplus countries responsible for the subprime crises which developed during the boom after the US slowdown in 2001 and 2002. 12 However, without the lack of demand caused by the huge current account defi cit, interest rates in the USA would not have been as low after 2001 as they were.
With the outbreak of the subprime crisis in 2007 the USA may no longer be able to continue its function as the consumer of last resort, and may have much less room to manoeuvre in the foreseeable future. Th ere are also no other countries which would be able to take over this function from the USA. Europe and Japan suff er from their own problems -Europe from a needed but unsettled deeper integration and a mercantile orientation of its biggest economy (Germany), Japan from the defl ation which hit there after the implosion of the real estate and stock market bubble in the early 1990s.
To date, China has accumulated the highest foreign exchange reserves in the world.
13 Figure 4 shows that many other countries have increased their foreign reserves as well, especially developing countries. Th is development has led to the hypothesis that the world econ-11 If all countries use expansionary monetary policy to accomplish depreciation no country can depreciate and the world follows an expansionary monetary policy which may trigger growth. However, this is a very special case. 12 Th e subprime crisis is fi rst of all the result of the deregulation of fi nancial markets in the USA which started already in the 1980s under President Ronald Reagan. 13
At 30th September 2008 China held 1,906 billion $ foreign reserves, Japan 955 billion $ and Russia 475 billion $ (Bloomberg 2008). omy has implicitly fallen back to a revived Bretton Woods system with the same stabilising eff ects as the original (Dooley et al. 2003) . As in the old Bretton Woods system the US dollar is seen in the centre. According to this hypothesis the periphery consists mainly of Asian countries, with some Latin American countries and Japan stabilising their currencies against the US dollar. Th e central banks in these countries buy an unlimited amount of US dollars to keep their exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar stable. Th us, passively, the USA is pushed into a constellation with high current account defi cits. Th is new system, so the argument, underlines mutual interest and can last for decades as the periphery can follow export-led growth and the United States can achieve high welfare gains due to their overvalued currency.
Th e hypothesis of a revived Bretton Woods system is not very plausible (Eichengreen 2007) . Firstly, the sterilisation policies of central banks can reach their limits. Secondly, the new system is not based on an international treaty. Instead, it is a kind of private cartel. Th irdly, the euro doesn't have a role to play in the revived Bretton Woods system and is in competition with the US dollar. In the case of a collapse of the US dollar only the fi rst central bank that switches from reserves held in US dollars into reserves held in euro will avoid losses. As the number of countries in the revived system is large, the private cartel can break down any time, which can lead to violent exchange rate movements between the euro and the US dollar. Fourthly, for the USA the system is a mixed blessing. Without a doubt it increases the current real consumption in the USA, however, it reduces domestic growth and employment and destroys the entire industrial sector in the USA.
Solutions
Th e huge surpluses of the Chinese current account are not sustainable and ultimately not in China's best interest. Th e high proportion of exports in per cent of GDP makes Chinese growth very dependent on world market development, especially on the development in the USA and Europe. In China, consumption as a share of GDP has to be increased and exports as a share of GDP reduced. Over the past years Chinese private consumption in per cent of GDP dropped to around 50 per cent of GDP (China Statistical Yearbook 2008) . In international comparison this is extremely low and shows that consumption demand is not suffi ciently developed in China. Th is low consumption is at least caused in part by the unequal income distribution in China and the rudimentary existing social safety-net which also leads to high household savings. Th is poses a dilemma for Chinese politicians. Th e external imbalance in the form of high current account surpluses is not sustainable. However, at the same time a reduction in export demand and GDP growth may escalate social tensions in China. Caught in such a quandary, China cannot really be expected to take quick and decisive steps on her own. Th e economic downturn in the USA after the most recent subprime crisis and the worldwide slowdown will reduce Chinese exports, but it seems that this eff ect is not strong enough to reduce the Chinese surpluses suffi ciently.
Th e revived Bretton Woods system is crisis-ridden as the centre of the system, the USA, is unable to continue fulfi lling the function as the consumer of last resort. Should the USA fall into a deep and long recession, its current account defi cit will most likely become a key political issue. In such a scenario China and other surplus countries will defi nitely be urged to appreciate and reduce their surpluses in the current account. If the USA follows a policy of reducing their defi cit quickly it will probably use administrative measures such as tariff s and quotas.
14 In this case, the USA would suddenly change from being a consumer of last resort to the demand reducer of the world. If countries in the periphery are not helped to overcome current account crises and are forced to reduce domestic growth radically, the world economy will be back in the same constellation as in the 1930s (Kindleberger 1986) .
China is merely one part of a larger problem that needs to be solved. It is highly desirable for the world economy to fi nd an eff ective mechanism to check destabilising current account imbalances fi rstly by stimulating demand in surplus countries, and secondly by adjusting the exchange rate if there is a fundamental disequilibrium measured in current account imbalances. In Asia adjustment of the RMB exchange rate has to be coordinated with adjustments of a number of other exchange rates in that region (Palley 2005) . What is needed is coordinated worldwide demand management, combined with exchange rate adjustments in a situation of fundamental current account disequilibria. Going in this direction means the creation of a real new Bretton Woods system which coordinates macroeconomic policies, central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market, and allows for international capital controls and the revitalisation and reform of the International Monetary Fund.
